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1992: HIGH TIME FOR AMERICAN 
LAWYERS TO LEARN FROM EUROPE, 
OR ROSCOE POUND'S 1906 
ADDRESS REVISITED 
James R. Maxeiner * 
INTRODUCTION 
The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union has created conditions conducive to a new study 
of foreign law. The countries of the former East Bloc are 
transforming state-planned economies into free market econo-
mies that will eventually join international markets. Suddenly, 
Eastern Europeans have very real needs to study foreign law. 
They require a host of modern laws to facilitate free markets, 
and they need to understand the legal systems of their Western 
trading partners. The American Bar Association (the "ABA") 
is establishing a Central and Eastern European Law Institute to 
promote this new study of foreign law and has initiated other 
programs to help Eastern Europeans learn about U.S. law. 1 
The collapse of Communism is not· the only occasion for 
the study of U.S. law as foreign law. Most American lawyers 
are not fully aware of the extent to which U.S. legal ideas have 
been received abroad. In Germany, for example, U.S. law has 
had profound effects on many fields of law. U.S. experiences 
have heavily influenced German constitutional law, particularly 
in the areas of federalism and the scope and review of constitu-
tional rights. The German Constitutional Court was in some 
ways modeled after the U.S. Supreme Court.2 The United 
States itself imposed an antitrust law on Germany during the 
• Attorney-at-Law. New York. N.Y.; J.D.. Cornell Law School; LL.M .• 
Georgetown University Law Center; Dr. Jur.. University of Munich. A version of this 
Address was presented to the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee of the Asso-
ciation of the Bar of the City of New York on April 16. 1990. 
I. Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte. The ABA in Central and Eastern Europe. A.B.A. J.. 
Nov. 1991. at 10; Exporting Democracy: U.S. Lawyers Help Eastern Europe Draft New Con-
stitutions. A.B.A. J.. June 1990. at 18-19. 
2. See ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN &JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY. THE CIVIL LAw 
1 
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post-war occupation-the first antitrust law in Europe. Ger-
many did not reject the legal transplant, but reformulated it, 
and introduced its own law in 1958.3 Since then, Germans and 
others in the European Community (the "EC") have studied 
U.S. antitrust law as an aid in developing their own laws. Ger-
many introduced merge.r control laws in 1973 to complete its 
antitrust laws, and the EC followed in 1990. Ironically, in this, 
the 100th year of American antitrust law, antitrust laws may be 
better accepted in Europe than in their original home. In nu-
merous other areas, such as product liability, environmental 
law, franchising, and leasing, U.S. law has influenced the devel-
opment of law in Germany and in the EC. 
Indeed, in Germany there is scarcely a field of law that has 
developed without at least some attention to developments in 
the United States. Rolf Stiirner, professor oflaw at the Univer-
sity of Konstanz, recently reviewed the reception of U.S. law in 
Germany and suggested that U.S. law schools have become the 
"Bologna of the present."4 Stiirner noted that in the Middle 
Ages aspiring German jurists journeyed to Italy to begin ca-
reers; today they travel to the New World to study at a U.S. law 
school or to apprentice at one of the giant U.S. law firms. 
I. COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS COMPEL 
FOREIGN L4 W STUDY 
In reviewing the reception of U.S. law in Germany, 
Stiirner observed that there has been no comparable reception 
of European law in the United States. The prerequisite study 
of foreign law has not occurred. It is the rare American who 
has studied law in continental Europe. U.S. law schools pay 
foreign law little note. Present day proposals to deal with se-
vere U.S. legal problems hardly ever give serious attention to 
foreign experiences. For example, under the heading of alter-
native dispute resolution, U.S. lawyers consider everything 
SYSTEM 137-41 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing German constitutional court and judicial 
review). 
3. See ADOLF BAUMBACH & WOLFGANG HEFERMEHL, WETTBEWERBS-UND 
WARENZEICHENRECHT 1210-13 (8th ed. 1960). 
4. Rolf Stiirner, Die Rezeption u.S.-amerikanischen Rechts in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, ill FESTSCHRIFT FUR KURT REBMANN 839 (Heinz Eyrich et al. eds., 1989). 
Much the same has been said for Switzerland. Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception of 
American Law in Europe, 39 AM.]. COMPo L. 229, 230-35 (1991). 
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from mini-trials to mediation to coin-flipping, but rarely look 
at dispute resolution mechanisms used in Paris or Berlin. 
More perplexing still is the antagonism likely to greet the rare 
serious call for such study.5 
The momentous events in Eastern and Western Europe 
may lead to a lessening of American ignorance of European 
law. The unification of the internal market in 1992 and the 
collapse of Communism will require that the United States 
take increased note of foreign law. The requirements of inter-
national trade will permit no other choice if the United States 
is to be competitive. With the completion of the single Euro-
pean market on December 31, 1992, the EC will become the 
single largest free trading bloc in the world. The position of 
the United States as the world's industrial and military leader, 
which it el1ioyed in the years immediately following the end of 
the Second World War, will have come to an end. The ability 
of the United States to dictate to European allies will be gone 
for good. Americans will have no choice but to negotiate with 
Europeans as equals. The day when Americans could rou-
tinely impose their views and enjoy the application of U.S. law 
in commercial relations, without resistance, will be only a 
memory. Yet the need of the United States for international 
commerce will not diminish; it will grow. As U.S. military 
might becomes less relevant in a more cooperative and less an-
tagonistic world order, U.S. economic competitiveness be-
comes vitally important. 
If economic developments induce Americans to study for-
eign law more so that they are better able to deal with foreign 
legal systems, Americans should nonetheless use this opportu-
nity to learn more from foreign law. Recent events are likely to 
make such learning more attractive. European integration is 
likely to increase the intellectual appeal of the study of foreign 
law in the United States. Europe's "civil law" may undergo a 
5. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Gmnan Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 V. CHI. 
L. REV. 823 (1985), criticized in Ronald J. Allen et aI., The Gmnan Advantage in Civil 
Procedure: A Plea for More Details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative Scholarship, 82 Nw. 
V. L. REV. 705 (1988); Herbert L. Bernstein, Whose Advantage After All?: A Comment on 
the Comparison of Civil justice Systems, 21 V.C. DAVIS L. REV. 587 (1988); Samuel R. 
Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 734 
(1987); John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Pmce-
dure, 75 IOWA L. REV. 987 (1990). 
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renaissance as Europeans harmonize and unify their laws. U.S. 
lawyers less frequently will encounter different laws in different 
countries, and more often find a harmonized or even unified 
European law.6 Moreover, thanks to the United Kingdom's 
membership in the EC, that law will now be in English, and 
thus accessible to all U.S. lawyers. . 
Socialist law, once considered to be "different" from its 
civil law roots, will now surely return to those roots. 7 The for-
mer Eastern Bloc countries will not receive the common law. 
Their desire for association with the EC will impel them to-
ward harmonization with the civil law even if they had no such 
background.s The real question may be what, if anything, of 
"socialist law" will survive? 
European integration is also likely to divert European at-
tention from'the U.S. legal system. Europeans are likely to fo-
cus on harmonizing their own systems, just as U.S. attention 
has long focused on comparisons of the laws of fifty-one sepa-
rate legal systems. Europeans simply will have less time for 
understanding the U.S. system. Less attention may translate 
into less patience with the peculiarities of U.S. law. Europeans 
may challenge aspects of U.S. procedure and laws which they 
find distasteful. Such a challenge has already occurred. Under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the "GATT"),9 
certain American legal procedures that block foreign imports 
of patented goods were found to discriminate against for-
eigner producers. As a result, the United States must now 
6. For Henry Sumner Maine, "one of the most singular phenomena" of his day, 
dating from the French Revolution, was the "gradual approach of Continental Eu-
rope to a uniformity of municipal law," which led him to conclude that "Roman 
Law," or civil law, was "fast becoming the lingua franca of universal jurisprudence." 
HENRY SUMNER MAINE, Roman Law and Legal Education, in VILLAGE-COMMUNITIES IN 
THE EAST AND WEST 330, 361 (1876). 
7. Cf John Quigley, Socialist Law and the Civil Law Tradition, 37 AM. J. COMPo L. 
781 (1989). 
8. The recent State Treaty between East Germany and West Germany provides 
an explicit example. It provides: "The Law of the German Democratic Republic is to 
be formed according to the principles of a free, democratic, social order governed by 
the rule-of-Iaw and is to orient itself on the legal system of the European Community." Gemein-
sames Protokoll iiber Leitscitze, in BULLETIN [der Presse-und Informationsamt der 
Bundesregierung], May 18, 1990, at 526 (emphasis added). 
9. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 
1947,61 Stat. pts. (5) & (6), T.l.A.S. No. 1700,55 V.N.T.S. 187. 
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change those procedures. \0 
II. FOREIGN LA W STUDY SUPPORTS LA W REFORM 
While commercial dealings may provide the immediate 
impetus for the study of foreign law, learning for the purpose 
of law reform is a more cogent reason to study foreign law. 
The U.S. legal system suffers from serious deficiencies. Ac-
cording to former U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren 
Burger, "[o]ur system is too costly, too painful, too destruc-
tive, too inefficient for a truly civilized people."ll The study of 
foreign law, and of the civil law in particular, offers an alterna-
tive system that is worthy of a truly civilized people. 
Perhaps the most famous criticism of the U.S. legal system 
is Roscoe Pound's August 1906 address in St. Paul, Minnesota, 
"The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administra-
tion of Justice."l2 Pound devoted a substantial portion of his 
critique to "causes lying in the peculiarities of our Anglo-
American legal system."l3 Pound's address was an invitation 
to the study of foreign law. 
It should be a truism that any program of law reform be-
gins with consideration of how foreign legal systems deal with 
similar problems. In the United States,. however, it is not. 
Here is not the place to relate the story of comparative law in 
the United States, but suffice it to say that the coming of two 
world wars that began in Europe did not promote interest in 
European law as a source of solutions to U.S: legal problems. 
Today there is no excuse not to learn from others. It 
would be arrogant in the extreme to hold out U.S. law as a 
model for legal reform in Central and Eastern Europe and to 
refuse to recognize that other legal systems have much to offer 
the United States. Indeed, the possible contributions of the 
study of foreign law to legal reform in the United States are 
numerous. As an indication of the scope of possibilities, this 
address identifies a few concrete examples of fruitful areas for 
10. See 55 Fed. Reg. 3503 (1990). 
11. Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, Address 
Before the American Bar Association (Feb. 13, 1984), quoted in 52 U.S.L.W. 2471 
(Feb. 28, 1984). 
12. Roscoe Pound, The Ca1L5es of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Jus-
tice, reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964). 
13. Id. at 275. 
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study drawn from just one legal system-that of Germany. All 
of the areas provide solutions directly responsive to just one 
group of problems-those identified by Pound as peculiar to 
Anglo-American common law. Pound's problems and Ger-
many's solutions are chosen purely for convenience. 14 Study 
of these or other problems as handled in other legal systems 
could be equally fruitful. 
Pound identified five causes for dissatisfaction with the ad-
ministration of justice that he attributed to the peculiarities of 
the U.S. legal system. 
( 1) The individualist spirit of our common law, which agrees ill with 
a collectivist age. 
Pound began in his 1906 St. Paul address by referring to 
an article that he had recently published, in which he had ex-
plained in detail his view of the individualist spirit of the com-
mon law: 
Men have changed their views as to the relative importance 
of the individual and of society; but the common law has 
not. ... To-day, we look instead for liberty through soci-
ety .... The common law, however, is concerned, not with 
social righteousness, but with individual rights. It tries 
questions of the highest social import as mere private con-
troversies between John Doe and Richard Roe. 15 
In the St. Paul address, Pound repeated his point that 
"[tJhe chief concern of the common law is to secure and pro-
tect individual rights. 'The public good,' says Blackstone, 'is in 
nothing more essentially interested than in the protection of 
every individual's private rights.' "16 According to Pound, the 
U.S. common law system has relied mainly on individual initia-
tive to ensure efficient government and the proper regulation 
of private economic behavior. Pound concluded that "[iJn 
consequence, the courts have been put in a false position of 
doing nothing and obstructing everything."17 
In the generation after Pound's address, the United States 
14. Germany's is the Civil Law system that the author knows best. 
15. Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 339, 346 
(1905). 
16. Pound, supra note 12,35 F.R.D. at 280. 
17. Id. at 281. 
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saw the coming of the New Deal and the end of the common 
law's "obstructing everything." Today, instead of "doing 
nothing," many conservative critics would say that the com-
mon law does too much. However one judges the common 
law's effectiveness, the U.S. common law system still has much 
difficulty addressing questions of social import, which it con-
tinues to treat as private controversies. 
Questions of social import appear more frequently institu-
tionalized in the German legal system than in that of the 
United States. A principle of social justice is part of the Ger-
man constitution-not as an independent source of rights but 
as an aid in applying the constitution generally. IS Social limits 
on individual rights are explicitly recognized in the constitu-
tion. For example, article 14 of the German constitution pro-
vides that "[p]roperty and the right of inheritance are guaran-
teed."19 The same provision, however, also provides that 
"[p]roperty imposes duties. Its use should also serve the pub-
lic weal."20 In stark contrast is Pound's quotation from Black-
stone, which demonstrates the individualistic concern of the 
common law: "So great moreover is the regard 'of the law for 
private property, that it will not authorize the least violation of 
it; no, not even for the general good of the whole commu-
nity. "21 
The German concept of "social market economy" is a 
striking contemporary example of "liberty through society." 
The German social market economy looks to a free market, but 
imposes controls to prevent individuals from suffering under it 
and to protect matters of general public interest. Competition 
is protected in a social market economy, in part, to provide a 
limit on private economic power.22 The State Treaty be-
tween East and West Germany, which governed the currency 
union of July 1990, explicitly adopted the social market econ-
omy. Article 1, paragraph 3 states that "[t]he basis of the eco-
18. See Philip Kunig, The Principle of Social justice, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 187 (Ulrich Karpen ed., 1988). The German consti-
tution is known as the Basic Law. 
19. [d. at 233. 
20. [d. 
21. Pound, supra note 15, at 346 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*139). 
22. See JAMES MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN ANTI-
TRUST LAw, A COMPARATIVE STUDY 7 (\ 986). 
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nomic union is the social market economy as the common eco-
nomic system of both contracting parties."23 The few calls for 
a separate East German state as a more "social" alternative to 
unification went unheeded because the availability of the Fed-
eral Republic's social market model made unnecessary a choice 
between socialism and unmitigated capitalism. Article 1, para-
graph 4 of the State Treaty provides further that "[t]he social 
union forms together with the currency and economic unions a 
unity. In particular, it is defined by a labor law system comply-
ing with the social market economy and a comprehensive sys-
tem of social security resting on principles of just reward for 
performance and social equalization. "24 
The social safety net of capitalist Germany is better con-
structed than that of the United States. Only today do Ameri-
cans begin even to speak of comprehensive health insurance 
for all Americans. However, such insurance has long been the 
rule in Germany. Indeed, social security got its start over a 
century ago under Bismarck.25 While in the United States the 
Chicago School advocates a single goal policy for antitrust, 
Germany clearly rejects such a limited policy.26 
Contemporary German administrative law provides a so-
phisticated system that seeks to balance the protection of indi-
vidual rights with societal concerns. German administrative 
law offers many valuable ideas for the control and direction of 
those charged with determining general welfare.27 Building on 
French models, the German system furnishes a thorough, com-
prehensive, and largely effective control of administrative dis-
cretion. Two decades ago, Kenneth Culp Davis, the dean of 
U.S. administrative law scholars, called attention to the advan-
tages of the German system and encouraged Americans to 
23. Vertrag iiber die Schaffung einer Wiihrungs- Wirtschafts-und Sozialunion, in BULLETIN 
[der Presse-und Informationsamt der BundesregierungJ, May 18, 1990, at 517. 
24. [d. at 518. 
25. See GERHARD A. RITrER, DER SOZIALSTAAT: ENTSTEHUNG UND ENTWICKLUNG 
1M INTERNATIONALEN VERGLEICH 60-86 (1989). See generally WILLIAM HARBUTT DAW-
SON, SOCIAL INSURANCE IN GERMANY 1883-1911 (1912). 
26. See MAXEINER, supra note 22, at 152 n.17. 
27. These protections were further strengthened following the Nazi perversion 
of the social side of law. In Nazi jurisprudence, the following maxim prevailed: 
Everything useful to the people is right; everything that injures them is wrong. See 
generally INGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 68-81 
(Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 1991) (discussing application of Nazi jurispruden-
tial principles). 
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study it.28 Not an American, but a common lawyer from India, 
has followed up on Davis's suggestion.29 
(2) The common law doctrine of contentious procedure, which turns 
litigation into a game. 
The "sporting theory of justice" was a recurrent theme of 
Pound's.30 According to Pound, it meant that "[t]he inquiry is 
not, What do substantive law and justice require? Instead, the 
inquiry is, Have the rules of the game been carried out 
strictly?"31 Despite numerous attempts at reform since Pound 
spoke these words-including the introduction of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure-they remain as true as ever. . 
Among German executives, involvement in U.S. litigation 
is considered a "traumatic experience," ifnot "a nightmare."32 
Stiirner, who is generally favorable to the reception of U.S. law 
in Germany, notes that in civil procedure, U.S. law serves 
chiefly as a negative example or "antipode" for Germany.33 
John H. Langbein, professor of law at Yale Law School, has 
written eloquently on what he calls the "German Advantage in 
Civil Procedure." He finds the principal advantage· to be that 
the German judge has charge of fact-finding. 34 This seems 
particularly relevant in the United States today, as virtually 
every meaningful proposal for reform of the American litiga-
tion system calls upon judges to be "managerial," and to take 
more responsibility for the cases they handle.35 
Langbein's judgment may be taken a step further. Ger-
man judges decide cases because that is their task. They are 
naturally interested not in the rules of the game, but in applying 
the law, and in determining what substantive law aIidjustice re-
quire. In these days of Critical Legal Studies and Legal Real-
ism, to suggest that judges should apply the law to the facts 
28. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 
191-95 (1969). See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN EUROPE 
AND AMERICA (1976). 
29. See MAHENDRA P. SINGH, GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAw IN COMMON LAw PER-
SPECTIVE (1985). 
30. Pound, supra note 12, 35 F.R.D. at 291. 
31. [d. at 282. 
32. See james R. Maxeiner, Book Review, 23 INT'L LAw. 321, 323 (1989). 
33. Sturner, supra note 4, at 850. 
34. Langbein, supra note 5, at 848. 
35. [d. at 858-62 (discussing methods of managerial judging). 
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may seem a quaint notion or, worse still, evil formalism. How-
ever, this conception is a fundamental tenet of German civil 
procedure and produces more efficient and just results than 
are usually available in the United States.36 
One example shows how managerial judging can be supe-
rior to U.S. procedures. Suppose a plaintiff in the United 
States brings a case involving four different claims. Each claim 
requires proof of four different factual elements. One element 
is common to all, and the parties dispute it ferociously. In a 
German case the judge will address the common issue first. 
Resolution of that issue, which may be simple and may require 
only hearing the views of a few witnesses, could obviate consid-
eration of any of the other, possibly complicated issues. In the 
United States, the judge will not decide the one central issue 
because it is an issue of fact, and will instead send the parties 
off to engage in months, if not years of aimless, expensive dis-
covery. 
(3) Political jealousy, due to the strain put upon our legal system by 
the doctrine of the supremacy of law. 
Pound complained that "the subjects which our constitu-
tional polity commits to the courts are largely matters of eco-
nomics, politics and sociology upon which a democracy is pe-
culiarly sensitive. Not only are these matters made into legal 
questions, but they are tried as incidents of private litiga-
tion. "37 At a time when U.S. courts run prisons and school 
systems, Pound's own example from 1905 hardly seems dis-
tant: "[We] have seen the collection of taxes from railroad 
companies, needed for the every-day conduct of public busi-
ness, tied up by an injunction. The strain put upon judicial 
institutions by such litigation is obviously very great."38 
While not always successful, the German legal system at-
tempts to separate legal questions from political ones. A legal 
question should be subject to resolution without having to 
36. For general discussions of German civil procedure, see generally Benjamin 
Kaplan et aI., Phases ofGennan Civil Procedure (pts. 1& 2),71 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1443 
(1958); Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Some Comparative Reflections on First Instance Civil 
Procedure: Recent Reforms in Gennan Civil Procedure and in the Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 609 (1988). 
37. Pound, supra note 12,35 F.R.D. at 282-83. 
38. Id. at 283. 
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value public interest, because the valuing of public interest is a 
peculiarly political task. For example, generally in German an-
titrust law, questions relating to judgments of what is "compe-
tition" and what is an appropriate level of competition are de-
cided by administrative authorities that are politically responsi-
ble, and not by the ordinary courts, which are not subject to 
political control. 39 
The German Constitutional Court provides another exam-
ple of how the German legal system attempts to remove poli-
tics from the everyday functioning of the judicial system. The 
Constitutional Court itself, of course, does decide political 
questions. Few German constitutional scholars would ear-
nestly contend that the Court can simply and objectively apply 
the Constitution to a fact situation, even though this is the goal 
of German law generally. Nevertheless, the German legal sys-
tem seeks to draw constitutional questions, such as the consti-
tutionality of a tax law, to the Constitutional Court. The sys-
tem functions in two ways. First, only the Constitutional Court 
has the power to declare a statute unconstitutional. When a 
constitutional law question arises in the course of litigation, if 
its resolution would require such a decision, the lower court 
must refer that question to the Constitutional Court.40 Sec-
ond, the existence of a "case or controversy" in the U.S. sense 
is not required for the German Constitutional Court to con-
sider an issue. Instead, "abstract" challenges to constitutional-
ity may be brought by one-third of the members of parliament, 
by the federal government, or by a state government.41 Chal-
lengers need not wait for the legislation to be applied to a par-
ticular case. 
39. See generally MAXEINER, supra note 22. This situation, however, may be 
changing. See generally James R. Maxeiner, Berlin Brief-West Gennany Amends Its Anti-
trust Law, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 3, 1990, at I. 
40. Basic Law, art. 100, § I, translated in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL RE-
PUBLIC OF GERMANY, supra note 18, at 277. 
41. ld. art. 93, § I, d. 2, translated in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUB-
LIC OF GERMANY, supra note 18, at 273; see Helmut Simon, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, in 2 
HANDBUCH DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS 1253, 1265 (Ernst Benda et al. eds., 1984). 
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(4) The lack of general ideas or legal philosophy, so characteristic of 
Anglo-American law, which gives us petty tinkering where 
comprehensive reform is needed. 
Here Pound was not referring to some highfalutin "legal 
theory," but to the very practical idea of law as science or sys-
tem. Pound addressed the U.S. bar just six years after Ger-
many's justly famous Civil Code went into effect. That very 
month, Frederic W. Maitland gave an address in praise of the 
making of the German Civil Code. Maitland called it "a great 
achievement" and a '~ust cause for national pride."42 To 
Maitland, Germany had set its "legal house in order," and had 
"striven to make [its] legal system rational, coherent, modern, 
[and] worthy of [the] country and our century."43 The German 
Civil Code was neither the first nor the last example of an ap-
plication of systematic, rational thinking to law that treated law 
as science. Long before Maitland, common lawyers familiar 
with the civil law admired it for its keen sense of system.44 
In another address to the American Bar Association in 
1912, Pound stressed the civil law's sense of system and noted 
that 
[iJf one doubts it, he has only to compare a modern institu-
tional book on the Roman law, a modern elementary text-
book of French law or a modern introduction to the Ger-
man code with the conventional Anglo-American text-book 
of elementary law to see that we have no true system of the 
common law, much less a system of the law that actually 
governs.45 
For one schooled in both systems, it seems hard to emphasize 
this point too much. 
While German students complain about the excesses of 
theory, and there certainly are some excesses, there is great 
value in systematic legislation and legal development. This 
value is not given sufficient credit in the United States, where 
42. See FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, The Making of the German Civil Code, in 3 
THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 474, 484 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 
1911). 
43. [d. at 476. 
44. See 1 ARTHUR BROWNE, COMPENDIOUS VIEW OF THE CIVIL LAw (1797). See 
generally MAINE, supra note 6. 
45. Roscoe Pound, Taught Law, in REPORT OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEET-
ING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 975, 981 (1912). 
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there is instead excessive concern with individualization and 
extreme opposition to "formalism." Systematization fosters 
efficient, rational, and equitable application of the law. It con-
tributes to making justice under the law equal. It also facili-
tates the development of comprehensive solutions to 
problems, rather than providing inadequate answers in piece-
meal fashion. 
Systematization does not necessarily mean codification. 
Indeed, codification seems harder and harder to achieve in 
Germany today. While there have recently been new German 
codes of administrative procedure, and of building and plan-
ning, as well as a substantial recodification of the criminal 
code, most observers would probably say that the day of codifi-
cation has passed. What the future holds for the EC and its 
harmonized legislation is uncertain. But even if codification is 
gone and the standards of legislation are not what they once 
were, the fact remains that the general level of legislation is 
markedly higher in many European countries than in the 
United States. In Europe, there is a developing "science of 
legislation," which provides guidelines in drafting systematic 
legislation.46 There, systemization is valued and produces pos-
itive results. 
Systematization goes beyond codification of substantive 
law. It extends to the organization of law, including the deter-
mination of the applicable law and the competent decision 
maker. For example, the United States and Germany are both 
federal countries, but in Germany there is considerably less 
confusion about which law to apply and which decision maker 
is competent. In federal Germany, most important laws are 
federal laws, although state authorities carry them out. Thus, 
there is only one civil code and only one criminal code to ap-
ply. Each is federal, but in the first instance each is applied by 
authorities of the individual states. In each state, there is only 
one state court system that applies federal and state law. 
There is no separate federal court system. The federal courts 
are above the individual states' systems, and exist only to re-
46. For an annotated, selected bibliography through 1985, see von Eberhard 
Baden, Allswahlbibliographie WI' Gesetzgebllngslehre, in GESETZGEBUNGSLEHRE: GRUND-
LAGEN-ZUGANGE-ANWENDUNG 187-201 (W. Schreckenberger et at. eds., 1986). For 
developments since then, see the ZEITSCHRIFT FUR GESETZGEBUNG, which has ap-
peared· since 1986. 
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solve questions of federal law. Were the United States to have 
such a system, a great amount of wasted effort would be 
avoided in determining which law applies or which court has 
jurisdiction. 
(5) Defects of form due to the circumstance that the bulk of our legal 
system is still case law. 
Pound spoke on case law in St. Paul, Minnesota, the home 
of West Publishing Company. In the 1880s West gave the case 
law system a new lease on life when it introduced the regular 
publication of opinions and a comprehensive and systematic 
digest system. The problem was then, as Pound observed, a 
subject of intense debate. John F. Dillon, a noted ABA presi-
dent, complained that "[a]n almost unlimited number [of 
cases] can be found upon almost any subject."47 Some mem-
bers of the Bar, however, recognized a better solution than 
West digests. In 1885, a committee of the ABA chaired by 
David Dudley Field reported: 
We can imagine a primitive society, in which a king and his 
judges were the only magistrates. They had made no laws. 
The judges decided each controversy as it arose, and by de-
grees what had been once decided came to be followed, and 
so there grew up a system of precedents, by the aid of which 
succeeding cases were decided. Hence came judge-made 
law. But could any sane man suppose that this was a 
scheme of government to be kept up when legislatures 
came in?48 
Unfortunately, the Bar did not listen to Field's report, and 
what appeared to be a flood of cases in 1885 is today but a 
drop in the bucket. But once again, the salvation is West Pub-
lishing Company-this time in the form of a computer search 
serVIce. 
This is another area where study of foreign law could be 
productive for U.S. lawyers. Unfortunately, in the many U.S. 
discussions of stare decisis and the supposed benefits of case 
47. JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 
243 (1895). 
48. Report of the Special Committee Appointed to Comider and Report Whether the Present 
Delay and Uncertainty in Judicial Administration Can be Lessened. and if so, By What Means, in 
REPORT OF THE EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 323, 
348 (1885). 
1991-1992] MAXEINER ADDRESS 15 
law, scarcely a word is found about case law and statute law in 
civil law countries. In Europe, since the Second World War, 
there has been a very substantial literature discussing the role 
of case law in civil law systems, much of which focuses on both 
civil law and common law systems.49 While case law in civil 
systems has yet to be formally recognized as generally binding, 
scarcely a jurist in Germany would not acknowledge that case 
law has achieved great importance. 
CONCLUSION 
Events in Europe are impelling Americans to give Euro-
pean civil law systems more attention. While commercial con-
siderations are providing the catalyst, better U.S. law could be 
a by-product. Americans familiar with European systems will 
recognize, as Pound did, the extent to which the causes for dis-
satisfaction with the administration of justice in the United 
States lie in our peculiar legal system. With knowledge of civil 
law systems, we could work better for the future that Pound 
sought, one where our courts will be "swift and certain agents 
of justice" and the "sporting theory of justice" will be just a 
memory. 
49. See, e.g., DIE BEDEUTUNG VON PRAJUDIZIEN 1M DEUTSCHEN UND FRANZQSISCHEN 
RECHT (Uwe Blaurock ed., 1985); JOSEF ESSER, GRUNDSATZ UND NORM IN DER 
RICHTERLICHEN FORTBILDUNG DES PRIVATRECHTS (1956); WOLFGANG FIKENTSCHER, 
METHODEN DES RECHTS IN VERGLEICHENDER DARSTELLUNG (1975-77); O.A. GERMANN, 
DURCH DIE JUDIKATUR ERZEUGTE RECHTSNORMEN (1976); O.A. GERMANN, PROBLEME 
UND METHODEN DER RECHTSFINDUNG (1965); OSCAR ADOLF GERMANN, PRAJUDIZIEN 
ALS RECHTSQ.UELLE (1960); Wolfgang Fikentscher, Eine Theorie der Fallnonn als Grun-
dlage von Kodex-und Fallrecht, in 1980 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 161. 
